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COMMENTS
The Court has never held that a coerced confession can be used as
evidence on which to base a conviction, nor does it do so in the prin-
cipal case.*
There is a need for more definite criteria to determine the coercion
issue. The lack of definition seems to stem from the fact that the
Court cannot agree on the comparative weight to be given to the
right of the public to have criminals eliminated from society and the
right of the individual to be free from improper police procedure. Per-
haps the state legislatures should adopt an acceptable standard, such
as the rule employed in federal cases.24
CORPORATIONS--POWERS-CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS
A. P. Siizith Manufacturing Co. t'. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953)
A New Jersey corporation engaged in manufacturing and selling
water and gas equipment resolved to contribute $1,500 to Princeton
University's general maintenance fund. Minority stockholders ob-
jected that the contribution was ultra vires, and the corporation in-
stituted an action for a declaratory judgment. The lower court held
that the act was not ultra vires because the contribution was as a
matter of law a direct benefit to the corporation.' On appeal the
lower court's judgment was affirmed on the ground that reasonable
charitable contributions by corporations, even if there had been no
express statutory provision,- are within the corporation's implied and
incidental powers under common law principles.-
American cases have consistently held that a non-charitable cor-
poration is formed to transact business to obtain the maximum profits
for its stockholders and not to make philanthropic contributions.4
Unlike a natural person, a corporation does not have the power to
make donations for the benefit of mankind in general.5 A corporation
23. The procedure in New York, as in many other states is to submit the
confession to the jury for judgment on the coercion issue. If te jury rejects the
confession, then it cannot enter into the verdict and the conviction must stand
on the basis of other sufficient evidence. Thus, the confession does not enter into
the evidence on which the conviction is based. If Mr. Justice Jackson felt that a
confession coerced as a matter of law could enter into the conviction, he would
not have considered the question of coercion, but would merely have decided that
there was sufficient other evidence on which to convict. His lengthy (4 pages)
consideration of the question of coercion shows that this was not his view.
24. See note 5 supra.
1. 97 A.2d 186 (N.J. 1953).
2. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14: 3-13.2 (1950). See note 14 infra.
3. 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953).
4. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919). The sole
function of a non-charitable corporation is to make a profit. BALLANTINE, COR-
PORATIONs 228 (Rev. ed. 1946).
5. An individual and a corporation are not to be equated under all circum-
stances. STVENS, CORPORATIONS 218 (1936). Contributions resulting in benefits
which are to be enjoyed substantially by the general public are not to be con-
sidered incidental to the purpose for which the corporation is chartered, and
hence would be ultra vires. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668
(1919).
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at common law has the power to make "charitable" contributions
only if a direct and immediate benefit to the corporation, furthering
its corporate purpose, results from the contribution. The testimony
of responsible corporate officers7 and directors8 is given weight in
determining the directness of the benefit enjoyed by the contributing
corporation.
The corporation's role in the educational field has been examined
by various courts. Under a strict view of the direct benefit require-
ment, contributions of any type to educational institutions would be
considered ultra vires.9 A broader conception of direct benefit was
applied in Armstr ,ng Cork Co. v. Meldrum Co.,1 where the power of
the corporation to donate money for the establishment of a school for
the "science of business" at two local universities was challenged. The
court upheld the contribution and said that the corporation had re-
ceived direct benefit from the transaction because the educational
institutions were located where the corporation was doing business,
that there was a lack of adequate local facilities for such training,
and the need of trained employees by the corporation warranted the
expenditures. An even broader concept of direct benefit was used in
the leading case of Evans v. Brunner, Mond & Co.", The English
court there permitted a leading chemical corporation to distribute
£100,000 among the universities and scientific institutions of the
United Kingdom with a broad grant that the fund be used "for the
furtherance of scientific education and research." -Under this view
of direct benefit the contribution need not be restricted in its scope to
advancing the interests of the contributor's industry. Nevertheless;
6. Whetstone v. Ottawa University, 13 Kan. 320 (1874)' STMvNS CORPORA-
vro0S 217 (1936). In Hutton v. West Cork Ry., 23 Ch. D. 654, 673 (1883) Lord
Bowen made the classic remark: "... [C]harity has no business to sit at loards
of directors qua charity. There is, however, a kind of charitable dealing which is
for the interest of those who practise it, and to that extent... charity may sit
at the board, but for no other purpose.'
Contributions resulting in good will to the corporation could be considered
within the powers of the corporation. See, Armstrong Cork Co. v. Meldrum Co.,
285 Fed. 58, 59 (W.D.N.Y 1922); A. P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow, 97A.2d 186, 191-192 (N.J. 1953). There is nothing in the principal case to indicatethat the goodwill of the community or its customer s w the motive for giving, al-
though this inducement for the contribution appears highly probable.
7. Heinz v. National Bank of Commerce, 237 Fed. 942 (8th Cir. 1916).
8. Evans v. Brunner, Mond & Co., [1921] 1 Ch. 359. If the director's discretion
in applying the fund is challenged, however, the problem is not whether the actis ultra ves or 0nt ires; the problem is whether or not the director has com-
plied with the terms of the resolution authorizing the contribution.
9. See, Worthington v. Worthington, 100 App. Div. 332, 335, 91 N.Y. Supp,443, 445 (1st Dep't 1905). A corporation could make contribution of its assets to
educational institutions in certain limited circumstances. Whetstone v. Ottawa
University, 13 Kan. 320 (1874) (a corporation was permitted to donate parts ofits land as a site for a college).
10. 285 Fed. 58 (W.D.N.Y. 1922).
11. [1921] 1 Ch. 359.
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the English court recognized that the benefit must not be "too specula-
tive or too remote.112
Although the principal case was not decided upon statutory
grounds, New Jersey, like many other states,13 has statutes which
give a corporation the power to make such philanthropic contribu-
tions" as its directors consider expedient for the protection of cor-
porate interests. Furthermore, the corporation's obligation to society
is recognized, and it is given the express power to aid in the creation
or maintenance of educational institutions." The New Jersey statutes
empowering corporations to make philanthropic, social, and economic
betterment contributions do not interfere with the common law
rights and powers of corporations to make contributions which are
of direct benefit.'
The court in the principal case held that the corporation has the
implied and incidental power to make reasonable charitable contribu-
tions under modern conditions. The court, placing its determination
of benefit to the corporation on possible rather than demonstrable
benefit, adopted a long range view emphasizing the increased role of
corporations in support of education rather than the direct benefit
accruing to the donor. The court neither expessly rejected nor ex-
pressly approved the lower court's finding that the contribution would
result in a direct benefit to the corporation. The court did, however,
discuss several income tax cases which held that some contribution by
12. Evans v. Brunner, Mond & Co., [1921] 1 Ch. 359. There is also an indica-
tion that the size of the contribution must be reasonable in relation to the size of
the corporation. Id. at 365, 366.
13. Twenty-nine other states and Hawaii have statutes empowering corpora-
tions to make philanthropic contributions. E.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.385 (1949);
DzL. REv. CODs c. 8 § 122 (1953). Some statutes expressly state that contributions
must be for furtherance of corporate interests. Generally the statutes are broad.
These statutes often expressly include educational institutions as permissible
donees. Others use general phrases like "charitable" or "eleemosynary." Some
states impose the restriction that the donees must be in the community where the
corporation is doing business. The amount a corporation may contribute is often
limited in some manner.
14. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:3-13 (1949). The defense contended that because
the corporation received its charter prior to passage of the statutes giving cor-
porations the power to make philanthropic contributions, the legislative enact-
ments are inapplicable; that the enactments constituted a charter alteration;
that a charter is considered a contract between the state and the corporation, the
corporation and the shareholders, and the shareholders inter se. BALLANTINE,
COPORATIONS 645 (Rev. ed. 1946). The defense further contended that the re-
serve power doctrine is not applicable when the rights between the corporation
and its stockholders inter se are affected. Charter alterations that concern matters
of public interest although they might affect relations between the stockholders
inter se are held valid under the reserve power doctrine. Murray v. Beattie Mfg.
Co., 79 N.J. Eq. 604, 82 Atl. 1038 (Err. & App. 1912); Berger v. United States
Steel Co., 63 N.J. Eq. 809, 53 Atl. 68 (Err. & App. 1912). Almost all of the
regulations of corporations justified under the reserve power doctrine might be
sustained under the police power of the state. Sutton v. New Jersey, 244 U.S. 258(1917); See, Note, 31 CoL. L. Rsv. 1163 (1930).
15. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:3-13.2 (1950).
16. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:3-13.3 (1950).
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corporations to charitable institutions were deductible as "ordinary
and necessary business expenses."17
There is no previous American case which under the circumstances
of the principal case has considered a contribution to a university
by a corporation of this type to be intr vires at common law.1, The
economic power of the nation in the twentieth century has shifted
from private individuals to corporations.YD As industrial methods
change, business methods must keep pace with this change.20 With
changing business methods, corporate acts become permissible which
earlier would not have been considered within the ambit of corporate
power. Today educational institutions face high operating costs and
they look to corporations for aid in solving their financial problems.
Individuals alone are unable to meet the demand. Industrial leaders
fear that if support for our educational institutions does not come
from private sources then it will come from public sources.21 The
17. Under INT. REv. CODn § 23 (q) charitable contributions by cor]?orations
are deductible without being classified as "ordinary and necessary business ex-
penses." Prior to the enactment of this section, such charitable contributions
were deductible only if they could be classified as "ordinary and necessary busi-
ness expenses." Such contributions were not always so classified. Donations to
the Red Cross made during World War I were considered not to be deductible
from income for the contributions were not considered to be of direct benefit to
the corporation. Niles Bement Pond Co. v. United States, 67 Ct. Cl. 693 (1929),
a'ffd, 281 U.S. 357 (1930); Consolidated Gas, Electric Light & Power Co. v.
United States, 65 Ct. Cl. 252 (1928), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 612 (1928).
When corporations were able to show benefit accruing to them for the aid of the
corporate purposes, the courts permitted these contributions to be deductible
business expenes. Fairmount- Creamery Corp. v. Helvering, 89 F.2d 810 (D.C.
Cir. 1937) (donation to a college by the corporation upon solicitation by a cus-
tomer of the firm); Forbes Lithographic Mfg. Co. v. White, 42 F.2d 287 (2d Cir.
1930) (contribution to a general welfare fund); American Rolling Mills Co. v.
Commissioner, 41 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1930) (contribution of $360,000 to a commu-
nity welfare fund); Coming Glass Works v. Lucas, 37 F.2d 798 (D.C. Cir. 1927),
cert. denied, 281 U.S. 742 (1930) (contribution to a fund to establish a hospital);
Greene County National Farm Association v. Federal Land Bank, 57 F. Supp.
783 (D. Ky. 1944), aff'd, 152 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 834
(1945) (contribution to a member of the Association); Times-Picayune Publishing
Co. v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 277 (1932) (donation to a local university by a
newspaper corporation to provide for a school of journalism). Factors which the
courts have used in deciding whether a contribution is an "ordinary and necessary
business expense" are: nature and size of the industry, location, number of its
employees as compared to the entire community, type of its employees, and what
other employers similarly situated are doing. American Rolling Mill Co. v. Com-
missioner, 41 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1930). If, however, the power of the corporationto makce these contributions had been in issue, rather than the deductibility from
gross income, a different result might have 6 een reached on the ground that a
direct and immediate benefit to the corporation would not have resulted fromthe ontribution.18. In the I orporation does not dominate the town in which
the university is located, and s forty miles away from the university.
19. Bleicken, CoWpoate Contributions to haritis, 38 A.B AJ. 999 (1952);
Cousens, Howo Far Corporaions Mal Contribute to Charitu, 35 VA. L. Rnv. 401
(1949) ; Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Manger Trzustees, 45 HARV. L. REV.1145 (1932) ... " 1 i 3 d0dN tibSityf
20. See, Steinway v. Steinwa &Sn, 17Ms. 4,47, 4N. •Supp. 718, 720
(Sup. Ct. 1896).21. See note 19 supra. Returns from endowment have shrunk and the costs of
operation have risen where it now takes two and one half times as much endow-
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court in the principal case was acutely aware of these facts and there-
fore stressed the concept of a dual function of the corporation which
prevailed in the eighteenth century: (1) To secure maximum profits
for their stockholders; (2) To give support to the general com-
munity., The court believed that the dire need of educational institu-
tions for funds, the corporation's public obligations, and changing
business methods justified considering the corporation's contribution
to an educational institution as within its common law powers. Al-
though the decision in the principal case is a departure from prior
common law precedents, it manifests a sound public policy. In view
of the fact, however, that the legislature had already adopted the same
policy, the action of the court in deciding the case on a common law
ground is unusual.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-DIVORCE--LIABILITY OF FATHER FOR NECES-
sARY EXPENSES OF CHILD IN MOTHER'S CUSTODY
Mahjaney v. Crocker, 98 A.2d 728 (Me. 1953)
The mother of a minor girl had been granted the temporary custody
of the child pending a divorce action and the father had been ordered
to pay her $15.00 per week for the child's support. A physician per-
formed an emergency appendectomy upon the daughter and a second
operation to relieve infection that had developed. Subsequent to the
appendectomy but prior to the second operation, the mother was
granted an absolute divorce and the temporary orders pertaining to
the custody and support of the child were continued in the final de-
cree. The physician then brought an action against the mother for
services rendered in performing both operations. In reversing a ver-
dict for the mother, based on the jury's feeling that the father should
pay, but unsupported by the evidence, the appellate court held that
inasmuch as the legal custody of the child had been given to the
mother, the law imposed upon her the primary obligation to furnish
the child such medical and surgical care which thereafter became
reasonably necessary.,
It is the prevailing rule that a father owes a legal as well as a moral
duty to support his infant children until they reach majority. 2 Where
ment to support a given enterprise as it did in 1929. Irving S. Olds, former
chairman of the board for U.S. Steel Co. said,
[EJvery American business has a direct obligation to support the free,
independent, privately endowed colleges and universities of this country to
the limit of its financial ability and legal authority. And unless it recognizes
and meets this obligation, I do not believe it is properly protecting the long
range interest of its stockholders, its employees, and its customers.
;,8 A.B.A.J. 999, 1000 (1952).
22. Dodd, For" Ihom Are Corporate Managers Trustees, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1145 (1932).
1. Mahaney v. Crocker, 98 A.2d 728 (Me. 1953).
2, 4 VERNIEI, AMERIcAN FAMILY LAws § 234 (1936).
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